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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to understand how loan structure a⁄ects (i) the borrower￿ s
selection of a mortgage contract and (ii) the aggregate economy. We develop a quantitative
equilibrium theory of mortgage choice where households can choose from a menu of long-term
(nominal) mortgage loans. The model accounts for observed patterns in housing consump-
tion, ownership, and portfolio allocations. We ￿nd that the loan structure is a quantitatively
signi￿cant factor in a household￿ s housing ￿nance decision. The model suggests that the
mortgage structure preferred by a household is dependent on age and income and that loan
products with low initial payments o⁄er an alternative to mortgages with no downpayment.
These e⁄ects are more important when in￿ ation is low. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the
real value of the mortgage payment and the outstanding loan overtime reducing mobility.
Changes in the structure of mortgages have implications for risk sharing.
Keywords: Housing ￿nance, ￿rst-time buyers, life-cycle
J.E.L.:E2, E6
￿We acknowledge the useful comments of Michele Boldrin, Suparna Chakrahorty, John Driscoll, George Fortier,
Karsten Jeske, Monika Piazzesi, Martin Schneider, Kjetil Storesletten, Eric Young, participants at the Conference
on Housing, Mortgage Finance, and the Macroeconomy held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, the System
Macroeconomic Meeting held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, and two anonymous referees. Michele
Armesto provided useful assistance. We are grateful to the ￿nancial support of the National Science Foundation
for Grant SES-0649374. Carlos Garriga also acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y
Tecnolog￿a through grant SEJ2006-02879. The views expressed herein do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis nor those of the Federal Reserve System. Corresponding author: Don Schlagenhauf,
Department of Economics, Florida State University, 246 Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180. E-mail:
dschlage@fsu.edu.
11. Introduction
Housing and its ￿nancing are important for both households and the overall economy. For house-
holds, the importance of housing is evident, as this purchase is typically the largest transaction.
The manner in which this purchase is ￿nanced is equally important for expenditure patterns and
asset accumulation. From a macroeconomic perspective, housing investment (both residential
and nonresidential structures) accounts for about half of all gross private investment, and the
liabilities from home mortgages are approximately equal to two-thirds of gross domestic product.
Historically, innovations in housing ￿nance have preceded important housing booms that
have had rami￿cations for prices and homeownership rates. In the 1920s, loan-to-value ratios
increased and the use of high interest rate second loans became more commonplace. The 1940s
saw an expansion of long-term self-amortizing ￿xed payment mortgages with even higher loan-
to-value ratios, as exempli￿ed by 20 percent downpayment loans o⁄ered by the Federal Housing
Administration. The boom in the early 2000s coincided with the expansion of prime and sub-
prime lending and further increases in loan-to-value ratios and changes in the loan structure that
allowed for ￿ exible repayment schedules coupled with initially lower entry costs. The connection
between housing ￿nance, housing markets, and the macroeconomy has become apparent given
recent turmoil in the subprime mortgage market. The ￿nancial turbulence resulting from the
housing meltdown has preoccupied policymakers because of the consequences for the aggregate
economy.
There is relatively little research that focuses on the implications of the structure of the
mortgage contract for either households or the aggregate economy. In a standard textbook
model that excludes ￿nancial frictions, all mortgage loans are equivalent. However, the evidence
suggests that households are subject to constraints that are not fully captured by the canonical
model. This partially accounts for the large empirical literature that focuses on the choice
between adjustable rate and ￿xed rate mortgages.1 The importance of the loan structure has
been ignored in the dynamic general equilibrium literature. One reason is that the standard
model often employs a one-period mortgage where the downpayment constraint is the only
relevant factor that impacts tenure decisions. We argue that it is important to separate the
e⁄ects of changes in the loan structure from the relaxation of downpayment constraints in an
environment with long-term mortgage contracts.
It is important also to acknowledge that the precise mechanisms through which changes
in housing ￿nance a⁄ect the productive economy and ￿nancial markets are not completely
understood. The research analyzing the connection between housing ￿nance and the economy
is limited partially because of the necessity of ￿rst understanding the determinants of mortgage
1Most of the literature is empirical and includes Alm and Follain (1984), Dunn and Spatt (1985), Kearl (1979),
LeRoy (1996), Stanton and Wallace (1998), and Shilling, Dhillon, and Sirmans (1987). Follain (1990) has written
a survey of this literature prior to 1990. An exception is Campbell and Cocco (2003), who solves a numerical
model with household mortgage choice over ￿xed-rate mortgage and adjustable rate-mortgage. They show that
￿xed rate mortgages should be attractive to risk-averse borrowing constrained households, in particular those with
high mortgage debt relative to their income. However, they do not consider di⁄erent dimensions of ￿xed-rate
mortgage products or the implications for prices and the aggregate economy.
2choice. Given the array of mortgage products, the optimal mortgage choice for a household
is a complex problem. Households have to take into consideration many dimensions such as
the downpayment, maturity of the contract, repayment structure, the ability to re￿nance, the
possibility of being subject to borrowing constraints, and the evolution of economic variables
such as the interest rate, in￿ ation, house appreciation, and income growth. For instance, the
optimal choice for a buyer moving into the housing market might be di⁄erent from a homeowner
looking to purchase a larger house. Therefore, understanding mortgage decisions requires a
framework that explicitly acknowledges the heterogeneity of households across age, income, and
wealth dimensions. In addition, these decisions must consider the complexities of the tax code
that favors owner-occupied housing. Only in such a framework can we understand mortgage
choice across households and its impact on the performance of the overall economy.
The objective of this paper is to understand the e⁄ects of mortgage structure, in the form of
alternative repayment and amortization schedules, for the household￿ s choice of ￿nancing a house
and the implications of this choice for the aggregate economy. We want to separate the e⁄ects of
changes in the structure of the loan from the relaxation of downpayment constraints. Given the
complexity of the problem, we restrict our attention to stationary equilibrium in an environment
with a restricted set of nominal mortgage contracts that are free from interest rate risk. This
restriction does not seem to be major, as more than 90 percent of the households use ￿xed-rate
mortgages. The failure to consider variable interest rate mortgage products could be important
for re￿nancing questions. At the household or individual level, the structure of housing ￿nance
a⁄ects the patterns of housing consumption, tenure, and mobility. For example, mortgage loans
with an increasing repayment structure that track the pro￿le of average labor income growth
early in the life-cycle may be attractive to younger, poorer, or borrowing-constrained house-
holds. However, for households that are not borrowing constrained and/or have consumption
levels that are less correlated with income growth, this loan structure should be less relevant
to the participation decision. From a macroeconomic perspective, the available choice of mort-
gage products can increase the participation in owner-occupied housing markets and residential
investment and also improve risk sharing (housing and non-housing goods). Changes in the ag-
gregate level of mortgage debt and the aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing can a⁄ect
the interest rate and the rental price of tenant-occupied housing.
To understand how the structure of mortgages e⁄ects mortgage choice and the aggregate
economy, we develop a quantitative equilibrium theory of mortgage choice. In the model house-
holds face uninsurable mortality and labor income risks and make decisions with respect to
consumption (goods and housing services) and asset allocations (capital and risky housing in-
vestment).2 The model stresses the dual role of housing as a consumption and risky investment
good. Investment in housing di⁄ers from real capital as a long-term debt (mortgage) contact
2It is important to note that in an environment with complete markets, mortgage decisions are irrelevant.
Households can always o⁄set any limitation of the mortgage loan (i.e., downpayment requirement) by borrowing
or lending in the asset market. Mortgage choice is meaningful in an environment with incomplete markets and
with borrowing constraints.
3must be used. This debt contract is nominal. Households can choose from a menu of mortgage
contracts that di⁄er in downpayment requirement, payment structure, and maturity so that
in equilibrium di⁄erent long-term mortgage loans coexist. House sales are subject to an idio-
syncratic capital gains shock that a⁄ects the value of the property.3 Allowing mortgage choice
increases the complexity of the computational problem. An environment that allows households
to choose over a large set of mortgage products is computationally infeasible. As a result, we
examine mortgage choice in an environment with a restricted set of mortgage products.
In recent years, there have been a number of papers that have examined housing in the
context of a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents. Some of these papers
are Berkovec and Fullerton (1992), Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009), Davis and
Heathcoate(2005), J.D￿az and Luengo-Prado (2002), FernÆndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002),
Gervais (2002), Jeske and Krueger (2005), Li and Yao (2007), Nakajima (2003), Ortalo-Magne
and Rady (2006), SÆnchez (2007), and SÆnchez-Marcos and R￿os-Rull (2006). Much of this
literature looks at the tax e⁄ects on housing choice or the wealth implications of housing. The
paper most related to this one is Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009) which uses a
similar model to account for changes in homeownership in the United States. The emphasis of
that paper is on decomposing the observed boom in real estate into demographic changes and
the relaxation of the downpayment constraint. We ￿nd that roughly two-thirds of the increase
in participation can be attributed to the introduction of mortgage loans that relax the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio constraint of young and poor households. The objective of this paper is to
emphasize the importance of the loan structure, and not the level of the downpayment, as a
determinant of housing ￿nance. To illustrate the di⁄erences between both margins, we ￿ndings
from an environment in which households can choose over a variety of mortgage structures with
the ￿ndings related to an environmenmt in which the down-payment constraint is relaxed. The
primary ￿ndings of this paper can be separated into two categories: the e⁄ects of loan structure
for mortgage choice and the aggregate implications.
We show that the structure of mortgage loans in terms of repayment pro￿les and amortization
schedules is a quantitatively signi￿cant factor for a households￿mortgage decisions, and has
important implications for tenure decisions and the size of the homes consumed. When the
downpayment requirement is high, households bene￿t from the introduction of loan products
with a variable nominal repayment structure. An increasing repayment loan structure increases
the participation in the owner-occupied market since it reduces the entry costs. In contrast, a
decreasing repayment structure shifts the demand away from the ￿xed-rate mortgage loan as
the former contract allows homeowners to maximize the equity in the house. We argue that
either the repayment pro￿le of the loan, a decline in the downpayment, or a combination of
both results in similar quantitative ways to increase participation in owner-occupied housing.
The presence of in￿ ation reduces real payments over the length of the loan. The structure of
3There has been a lot of discussion about the high growth rates of house prices. In this paper we do not seek to
explain the joint movement of house price and homeownership. The idea behind the introduction of idiosyncratic
capital gains is to partially capturing the risk associated to investing in real estate that is realized at sale.
4a mortgage has an important impacts on mobility. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the real
value of the mortgage payment and the outstanding loan overtime. This makes it easier for a
household to upsize their house and lessens the need to downsize their house.
From a more disaggregate perspective, the model provides three important insights . First,
the option of using a contract with either low initial mortgage payments or a higher loan-to-value
ratio has a positive impact on the participation rate of the lowest income group when compared
with the baseline model. This conclusion is independent of the degree of in￿ ation. The presence
of in￿ ation reduces the increase in participation for the lowest income group in all cases with the
exception of the hybrid case where strong general equilibrium e⁄ects are present. Second, the
majority of individuals in the two highest income groups prefer loans that maximize the equity
in the house such as the traditional FRM or the constant amortization product. This ￿nding is
not impacted by in￿ ation. Third, the presence of in￿ ation mitigates some of the negative e⁄ects
of increasing mortgage payments since its real value declines over the length of the loan.
In economies with incomplete markets and long-term mortgages, changes in the structure of
a mortgage has interesting e⁄ects on risk sharing. Homeowners can use the repayment structure
to smooth income risk. The actions of homeowners has general equilibrium price e⁄ects which
has bene￿cial e⁄ects for renters. We argue that loan structure can reduce the coe¢ cient of vari-
ation of consumption for homeowners. This reduction is especially important when we consider
mortgages with an increasing repayment structure and no in￿ ation. The presence of in￿ ation
reduces the coe¢ cient of variation of housing services at the expense of goods consumption.
Beyond policy implications, this paper ￿lls a few important gaps in the modeling of the
housing market. First, we employ a framework that explicitly models mortgage decisions using
contracts that last for several periods. The fact that houses are typically purchased through
long-duration mortgages is often ignored in other life-cycle models with housing. Long-duration
loans will have an e⁄ect on households￿ability to accumulate capital assets and smooth income
risk. Second, we implement an endogenous rental market where supply and demand is driven
completely by household decisions. As a result, we ￿nd that our model matches several features
of the housing market such as the rate of homeownership, the average house size, and portfolio
allocations.
This paper is organized into ￿ve sections. In the ￿rst section, we describe the properties of
di⁄erent mortgage contracts. In the second section, we describe the model economy and de￿ne
equilibrium. The third section discusses the estimation of the model to the US economy and
analyzes the performance of this model with a standard mortgage contract. In the next section,
we examine the implications of mortgage structure resulting from the household￿ s mortgage
choice and in the ￿nal section we focus on the rami￿cations of contract structure for the aggregate
economy.
52. Mortgage Contracts
2.1. Characteristics of mortgage contracts
A mortgage contract is a loan secured by real property. Mortgage lending is the primary mech-
anism used in most countries to ￿nance the acquisition of residential property. Since these
contracts are a debt contract, they are nominal contracts. These loans are structured as long-
term loans that require periodic payments consisting of an interest payment and a principal
payment. There are many types of mortgage loans, which can be broadly de￿ned by three
characteristics: the payment structure, the amortization schedule, and the term of the mortgage
loan. The payment structure de￿nes the amount and the frequency of mortgage payments. The
amortization structure refers to the size of the principal payments over the life of the mortgage,
and can be increasing, decreasing, or constant. Some contracts allow for no amortization of
the principal and full repayment of principal at a given date. Other contracts allow negative
amortization usually in the initial periods of the loan. The term or duration usually refers to
the maximum length of time given to repay the mortgage loan. The most common durations are
15 and 30 years. In theory, the combination of these three factors allows for a large variety of
distinct mortgage products to be constructed. Among this set, only a subset of products exists
in the marketplace.
Understanding mortgage loans is essential to understanding owner-occupied housing. In the
United States, according to the Residential Finance Survey in 2001, roughly 82.1 percent of the
housing units were acquired through mortgage loans while only 11.8 percent were purchased
with cash. The remaining acquisitions are ￿nanced through by inheritance, gifts, or divorce. A
key determinant of housing ￿nance is the set of loan products available to households. Until
the 1990s there were two predominant loan types: an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) and a
30-year ￿xed rate mortgage (FRM). However, substantial innovation in mortgage markets has
expanded the set of loan products, making mortgage choice even more complex. New mortgage
contracts have eliminated the necessity of a downpayments and have changed the loan structure.
The introduction of these products has increased opportunities for families that otherwise might
be unable to purchase a house. According to data from the Mortgage Market Statistical Annual,
the market share of nontraditional mortgage contracts has increased since 2000. Nontraditional
or alternative mortgage products include interest-only loans, option ARMs, loans that couple
extended amortization with balloon payment requirements, and other contracts of alternative
lending. For example, in 2004 these products accounted for 12.5 percent of originations. By
2006, the fraction increased to 32.1 percent of originations. With the share of conventional and
conforming loans declining over the period 1990 to 2006, it is important to examine the structure
of mortgage contacts.
2.2. General structure of mortgage contracts
Despite the di⁄erences in the observed types of mortgage contracts, all have the same fundamen-
tal elements: a downpayment, an amortization schedule, an interest payment, and outstanding
6principal. To characterize the various features of mortgage contracts it is useful to introduce
some general notation common to all contracts. Let z 2 Z = f1;:::;Zg be a speci￿c type of
mortgage loan from the set of available contracts that borrowers can use to purchase a house of
size h with a unit price p: A mortgage loan usually requires a downpayment to guarantee that
there is some equity in the house. We de￿ne ￿(z) 2 R to be the fraction of the house value
paid up-front by the homeowners. The term H0(z) = ￿(z)ph represents the initial amount of
equity in the house and D0(z) = (1 ￿ ￿(z))ph represents the value of initial debt owed to the
lender. At each period, t, the borrower faces a nominal payment amount that depends on the
size of the loan, D0(z); the term of the mortgage, N(z); the nominal mortgage loan interest
rate, rm(z); and repayment structure associated to each mortgage contract z: We denote the
nominal mortgage repayment schedule at time t as being determined by the function mt(x;z);
where x is de￿ned by the set (p;h;￿(z);N(z);rm(z)): This payment can be decomposed into an
amortization term, At(z); that depends on the amortization schedule of the mortgage loan and
an interest term, It(z); that depends on the outstanding debt. That is,
mt(x;z) = At(z) + It(z); 8t; (2.1)
where the interest payments are calculated by It(z) = rm(z)Dt(z): The law of motion for the
level of housing debt Dt(z) can be written as
Dt+1(z) = Dt(z) ￿ At(z); 8t: (2.2)
The law of motion for the level of home equity with respect to the loan Ht(z) is
Ht+1(z) = Ht(z) + At(z); 8t; (2.3)
where H0(z) = ￿(z)ph denotes the home equity in the initial period.
Notice that this formulation is very general, since it allows 100 percent ￿nancing when
￿(z) = 0 with an initial loan of D0(z) = ph and an all-cash purchase with ￿(z) = 1 with no
initial loan D0(z) = 0: Some contracts even allow closing costs to be rolled into the loan, so the
downpayment fraction could be negative, ￿(z) < 0: Next, we will discuss the speci￿cs of primary
mortgage contract types such as the standard ￿xed rate mortgage, a constant-amortization loan,
a balloon payment loan, combo-loans with a ￿nanced downpayment, and graduated mortgage
payments loan.
2.3. Fixed Payment or Fixed Rate Mortgage
Fixed payment or ￿xed rate mortgages (FRM) are considered the ￿standard￿ loan product
used to ￿nance the purchase of a house. This loan product is characterized by a constant
nominal mortgage payment over the term of the mortgage, m(x;zFRM) = m1(x;zFRM) = ::: =
mN(x;zFRM): The constant mortgage payment has the property of an increasing amortization
7schedule of the principal and a decreasing schedule for interest payments. Formally,
m(x;zFRM) = At(zFRM) + It(zFRM)
and satis￿es
m(x;zFRM) = ￿D0(zFRM);
where ￿ = rm[1￿(1+rm)￿N]￿1: Since the outstanding debt decreases over time, D0(zFRM) >
::: > DN(zFRM); the contract front loads the interest rate payments It(zFRM) = rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM);
and back loads the capital or principal payments given by
At(zFRM) = ￿D0(zFRM) ￿ rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM):
The level of debt is reduced by the repayment each period -
Dt+1(zFRM) = (1 + rm)Dt(zFRM) ￿ m(x;zFRM); 8t;
- and the equity in the house increases each period by the mortgage payment net of interest.
Ht+1(zFRM) = Ht(zFRM) + [m(x;zFRM) ￿ rm(zFRM)Dt(zFRM)]; 8t:
Because of in￿ ation, even though nominal mortgage payments are constant real payments decline
over the length of the loan. The rate of decline depends on the rate of in￿ ation.
2.4. Constant Amortization Mortgage
One of the features of the ￿xed rate mortgage is that little equity is accrued early in the
mortgage due the front loading of interest payments. A contract that does not have this feature
is the constant-amortization mortgage. This loan product assumes constant contributions to the
amortization schedule, At(zCAM) = At+1(zCAM) = A(zCAM); but since the interest repayment
schedule depends on the size of outstanding level of debt, Dt(zCAM); and the loan term, N,
the nominal mortgage payments mt(x;zCAM) are no longer constant. Formally, the constant
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2.5. Balloon and Interest-Only Mortgages
At the other end of the spectrum we have mortgage contracts with very little or no amortization
along the term of the mortgage. One example is the balloon loan where all the principal borrowed
is paid in full the last period, N: This product is popular in times where mortgage rates are high
and home buyers anticipate lower future mortgage rates. In addition, homeowners who expect
to stay in their home for a short duration may ￿nd this attractive because the lack of principal
payments reduces the total mortgage payments. The amortization schedule can be written as
At(zBAL) =
(
0; 8t < N;
(1 ￿ ￿)ph; t = N:
All the mortgage payments, except the last one, re￿ ect interest rate payments, It (zBAL) =
rm(zBAL)D0(zBAL). The mortgage payment for this contract is
mt(x;zBAL) =
(
It(zBAL); 8t < N;
(1 + rm)D0(zBAL); t = N;
where D0(zBAL) = (1 ￿ ￿)ph: The evolution of the outstanding level of debt can be written as
Dt+1(zBAL) =
(
Dt(zBAL); 8t < N;
0; t = N:
The other example is the interest-only loan, (BALI). With this mortgage contract the home-
owner never accrues more equity in the house than the initial downpayment. In this case,
At(zBALI) = 0 and mt(x;zBALI) = It(zBALI) = rmD0(zBALI) for all t: With this mortgage the
homeowner is e⁄ectively renting the property from the lender and the interest payments are the
e⁄ective rental cost.
Since no additional equity is accrued, nominal mortgage payments are the lowest with this
type of mortgage product. The homeowner is fully leveraged with the bank and maximizes the
return from housing investment when capital gains are realized. In the presence of mortgage
interest deductions, this contract becomes very attractive as the government subsidizes the
e⁄ective rental cost.
2.6. Graduate Mortgage Payments
In an environment with high housing prices, another product that may be of interest to ￿rst-
time buyers is the graduated payment-mortgage (GPM), where nominal mortgage payments
grow over time. This product could be attractive to ￿rst-time buyers as mortgage payments
are initially lower than payments associated with a ￿xed-rate contract. In an environment of
9increasing income pro￿les early in the life pro￿le, the GPM contract allows households to keep
housing expenses a relatively stable fraction of income. Of course, this product increases the
lender￿ s risk exposure because the borrower builds equity in the home at a slower rate than the
standard contract, which may explain the lack of popularity of this product.4 The repayment
schedule depends on the growth rate of these payments. We consider two di⁄erent cases that
di⁄er on the growth rate of mortgage payments.
1. Geometric Growth: In this type of contract, mortgage payments evolve according to a
constant geometric growth rate given by
mt+1(x;zGPMG) = (1 + g)mt(x;zGPMG);
where g > 0: Consequently, the amortization term and interest payments are also growing.
Formally,
mt(x;zGPMG) = At(zGPMG) + It(zGPMG);
with the initial mortgage payments being
m0(x;zGPMG) = ￿gD0(zGPMG);
where ￿g = (rm ￿ g)[1 ￿ (1 + rm)￿N]￿1: The law of motion for the level of debt satis￿es
Dt+1(zGPMG) = (1 + rm(zGPMG)Dt(zGPMG) ￿ (1 + g)tm0(x;zGPMG);
and the amortization term is At(zGPMG) = ￿gD0(zGPMG) ￿ rmDt(zGPMG):
2. Arithmetic Growth: In this case, the mortgage payment grows at a constant nomi-
nal amount, 4 = m1(x;zGPMA) ￿ m0(x;zGPMA): The law of motion for the repayment
schedule is
mt+1(x;zGPMA) = m0(x;zGPMA) + t ￿ 4)









The law of motion for the outstanding debt is
Dt+1(zGPMA) = (1 + rm)Dt(zGMPA) ￿ (m0(x;zGPMA) + t ￿ 4):
In this case the amortization term is At = (m0(x) + t ￿ 4) ￿ rmDt:
4In 1974 Congress authorized an experimental FHA insurance program for GPMs. In this program, negative
amoritization was permitted, but required higher downpayments so that the outstanding principal balance would
never be greater during the life of the mortgage than would be permitted for a standard mortgage insured by
FHA. Activity under this program and successor programs has been limited.
102.7. Combo or Piggyback Loan
In the late 1990s the combo or piggyback loan became a popular loan product for those who
wanted to avoid large downpayment requirements and personal mortgage insurance (PMI).5 This
loan product amounts to the use two di⁄erent loans. The primary loan covers a fraction of the
total purchase, D1(zCOM) = (1￿￿)ph; with a payment schedule, m1
t(x;zCOM); and a maturity,
N1: The second loan partially or fully covers the downpayment amount, D2(zCOM) = {￿ph,
where { 2 (0;1] and represents the fraction of downpayment ￿nanced by the second loan. The
second loan includes an interest premium, rm
2 = rm
1 + ￿ (where ￿ > 0); a nominal mortgage
payment, m2
t(x;zCOM); and a maturity, N2 ￿ N1: In this case
mt(x;zCOM) =
(
m1(x;zCOM) + m2(x;zCOM); when N2 ￿ t ￿ N1
m1(x;zCOM) when t < N2
and the laws of motion for both loans and home equity are computed as in the mortgage with
constant repayment. There are di⁄erent type of combo loans o⁄ered in the industry. For
example, a ￿80-15-5￿implies a primary loan for 80 percent of the value, a secondary loan for 15
percent, and a 5 percent downpayment. Another special case is the so-called ￿no downpayment￿
or a ￿80-20-0￿that corresponds to the traditional LTV rate of 80 percent using a second loan
for the 20 percent downpayment.
3. Equilibrium Model of Mortgage Choice
The model economy comprises of households, a representative ￿rm, a ￿nancial intermediary,
and a government sector. In this section, we discuss each of these elements in detail and de￿ne
the market-clearing conditions. The formal de￿nition of the recursive equilibrium for this model
appears in an appendix.
3.1. Households
The household sector is populated by overlapping generations of ex ante identical households
that face mortality risk and uninsurable labor earning uncertainty. Household age is denoted by
j; where each household lives a maximum of J periods. The survival probability conditional of
being alive at age j is given by  j+1 2 [0;1]; with  1 = 1 and  J+1 = 0: Preferences are de￿ned
over consumption goods, c; and housing services, d: Bundles of goods are ranked according to
an index function, u : R2
+ ! R. The function u(c;d) satis￿es ui > 0 and uii < 0 with respect
to each good, i = c;d: The utility function satis￿es the standard Inada conditions. Household




5Government-sponsored mortgage agencies initiated the use of this product in the late 1990s and this product
became popular in private mortgage markets between 2001 and 2002.
11Besides consumption (goods and housing service) decisions, households make portfolio de-
cisions to smooth out income uncertainty. We consider two distinct assets: a riskless ￿nancial
asset denoted by a0 2 A with a net (real) return r and a risky housing durable good denoted by
h0 2 H with a market price p (where the prime is used to denote future variables). In addition to
being an investment good, housing provides services according to the linear technology function
d = g(h0) = h0; which is bounded by the size of the investment, d ￿ h0: Housing investment is
￿nanced through long-term nominal mortgage contracts and is subject to transaction costs.
Household real income is stochastic during working years, j < j￿; and depends on a number
of factors. Basic wage income is denoted by w. In addition, a household￿ s earnings depend on
age. This factor is denoted as vj and introduces a life-cycle pattern to earnings. The remaining
factor is the idiosyncratic, stochastic factor, ￿ 2 E; which is drawn from a probability space and
evolves according to the transition law ￿￿;￿0: During the retirement years, j ￿ j￿, a household
receives a real retirement bene￿t from the government equal to ￿: In addition to earnings on
labor and ￿nancial wealth de￿ned as (1 + r)a; a household with a positive housing investment
can earn rental income by supplying housing services to the rental market, R(h0 ￿ d); where R
denotes the rental price. To receive rental income, households have to pay a ￿xed cost $ > 0
to enter this market.
Households are subject to a progressive income tax represented by a function T(ay); where ay
denotes households￿adjusted gross real income, ay:6 The importance of including a progressive
income code is to understand and account for the interaction between mortgage choice and the
tax code. Clearly, changes in the tax code and limits on deductions are likely to impact the
choice of mortgage. Adjusted income is de￿ned as
ay(a;h0;d;￿;j;￿j;q) =
(
w￿￿j + ra + R(h0 ￿ d) ￿ ￿; if j < j￿;
￿ + ra + R(h0 ￿ d) ￿ ￿; if j ￿ j￿;
(3.1)
where q = fp;R;r;rmg represents a price vector and ￿ represents deductions to gross real income.
Notice that the tax system treats owner-occupied and rental-occupied housing asymmetrically,
as rental housing services are taxed while the imputed service ￿ ow from owner-occupied hous-
ing services are not. The deduction of (real) mortgage payments for owner-occupied housing
introduces another asymmetry. After tax income (excluding rental income) is de￿ned as
y(a;h0;d;￿;j;￿j;q) =
(
(1 ￿ ￿p)w￿￿j + (1 + r)a + tr ￿ T(ay); if j < j￿;
￿ + (1 + r)a + tr ￿ T(ay); if j ￿ j￿;
(3.2)
where ￿p represents the social security contributions used to ￿nance the social security system.
In the presence of mortality risk and missing annuity markets, we assume borrowing constraints
a0 ￿ 0 to prevent households from dying with negative wealth. The proceeds from households
that die and have a positive housing investment and/or asset position are redistributed to the
6We assume standard properties of a progressive tax function such as di⁄erentiability T
0(ay) > 0 and T
00(ay) <
0; where T(ay)=ay > 0 represents the average income tax.
12living households as a lump-sum transfer, tr: We also assume that households are born with
some initial wealth.7
As we have previously mentioned, housing investment requires long-term ￿nancing through
nominal mortgage contracts. Since we focus on recursive equilibrium we want to summarize all
the relevant information on these long-term mortgage contracts with a ￿nite number of state
variables. In a stationary environment, the housing stock, h; the type of mortgage contract, z;
and remaining length of the mortgage, n; are su¢ cient to recover all the relevant information
such as the nominal mortgage payment, remaining liability in nominal terms, and nominal equity
in the house.8 Since households make decisions in a real environment, the nominal values from
the mortgage contract can be expressed in real terms by dividing by (1 + ￿e)
N￿n ; where ￿e is
the expected rate of in￿ ation. The nominal mortgage interest rate, rm(z); is de￿ned as the real
interest rate, r; plus the expected rate of in￿ ation. The Fisher equation implies that the nominal
mortgage rate rm = r + ￿e(1 + r) where ￿e represents the rate of anticipated in￿ ation.
Individuals make decisions about consumption goods, housing services, mortgage contract
type, and investment in assets and housing. The household￿ s current-period budget constraint
depends on asset holdings, the current housing investment, the remaining length of the mortgage,
labor income shock, and household age. We can isolate ￿ve possible optimization problems that
the household solves. The value function for a household is described by the state vector, which
depends on the entering asset position, a; the prior period housing position, h; the number
of periods remaining on an existing mortgage, n; mortgage contract type, z; the value of the
current-period idiosyncratic shock, ￿; and age, j. We will always characterize the value function,
v(￿); by the order of state variables, ￿ = (a;h;z;n;￿;j): We can think of the household as being
in one of ￿ve situations with respect to yesterday￿ s and today￿ s housing investment position.
1. Renter yesterday and renter today: Consider a household that does not own a
house at the start of the period, h = n = z = 0; where ￿ = (a;0;0;0;￿;j); and decides
to continue renting housing services in the current period, h
0
= n0 = z0 = 0; where










s:t: c + a0 + Rd = y(a;h0;d;￿;￿j;j;q);
where Rd denote￿ s the cost of housing services (dwelling) purchased in the rental market.
There is no restriction on the size of housing services rented.9 The restriction on the choice
7The purpose of this assumption is to account for the fact that some of the youngest households who purchase
housing have some wealth. Failure to allow for the initial asset position creates a bias against the purchase of
homes in the earliest age cohorts.
8It should be pointed out that h; z; and n are su¢ cient information to identify information about a contract
even when mortgage loans have di⁄erent maturities, N(z); and interest rates, r
m(z); over the length of the loan.
9Other housing papers impose some limits in the size of rental-occupied housing. In this paper, renters can
consume any amount of housing services.
13set indicates that asset markets are incomplete since short-selling is precluded and only a
noncontingent claim on capital is traded.
2. Renter yesterday and homeowner today: In this situation, we consider a household
that rented the previous period, so h = 0 and ￿ = (a;0;0;0;￿;j), and chooses to pur-
chase a house in the current period, h
0
> 0; where ￿0 = (a0;h0;N(z0) ￿ 1;z0;￿0;j + 1): The
housing investment requires a choice of mortgage, z0 2 Z, to ￿nance an initial expenditure
of (￿b + ￿(z0))ph0; where ￿b represents a transaction cost parameter and ￿(z0) denotes
the downpayment fraction associated with mortgage z0.10 The period nominal (and real)
mortgage payment is m(x;z0); where x = (p;h0;￿(z0);N(z0);rm(z0)): In this model housing
is a consumption and investment good where housing services can be transacted in the
market. To participate in the rental market each period as a landlord, households have to
pay a ￿xed operating cost, $ > 0:11 For these households, housing consumption satis￿es
d < h0 and they receive rental income, R(h0 ￿ d):12 Otherwise, the optimal housing con-
sumption is entirely determined by the housing stock, d = h0: In order to incorporate this
decision into the choice problem, we introduce an indicator variable, Ir; that takes on the











s:t: c + a0 + (￿b + ￿(z0))ph0 + m(x;z0) + g(h0;d) = y(a;h0;d;￿;￿j;j;q) + Ir
￿




Owning property requires a maintenance expense each period. The total maintenance
cost depends on the choice to supply rental property. If homeowners choose not to supply
housing services to the rental market (i.e., Ir = 0 ), then d = h0 and the maintenance
expense is given by g(h0;d) = ￿oph0; where ￿o represents the depreciation rate of owner-
occupied housing. Alternatively, a household can choose to supply housing services to the
rental market (i.e., Ir = 1): In this case, maintenance expense depends on the amount
of housing supplied to the rental market and their own consumption and is de￿ned as
10For computational reasons ￿ is not a choice variable in the model. The endogenous choice of downpayment
would require keeping track of an additional state for the downpayment choice since this decision is dynamic. A
higher downpayment today reduces both current and future mortgage payments.
11The decision to supply rental property is entwined with the decision to invest in housing. The separation of
housing consumption services and housing investment allows the rental market to be formalized while keeping
the state space relatively tractable. Introducing two di⁄erent housing stocks such as owner-occupied and rental-
occupied would require an additional portfolio choice, making the problem computationally infeasible.
As a result, all the landlords are homeowners but the not the other way around. Nevertheless, the American
Housing Survey reports that the fraction of individuals that report to receive rental income and rent the house
they occupy is practically zero.
12This formulation implies that a household that leases property uses a mortgage with a downpayment of
￿ percent of the value of the property. Although this may seem to be an unrealistic assumption, the POMS
Survey reports that 81.1 percent of rental property owners used some sort of mortgage ￿nancing in ￿nancing the
acquisition of rental property.
14g(h0;d) = ￿opd + ￿rp(h0 ￿ d); where ￿r represents the depreciation rate of rental housing.
The presence of moral hazard associated with renting property implies that there is a
spread in depreciation rates (4￿ = ￿r ￿ ￿o > 0) that reduces the implicit cost of owner-
occupied consumption. The choice of rental supply is complex because landlords not only
take into account the maintenance expense, but the tax provisions with respect to rental-
income. For a more detailed analysis of the tax treatment of homeowners and landlords,
see Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2007).
3. Homeowner yesterday and renter today: In this situation we consider a household
that is selling the property h > 0; where ￿ = (a;h;n;z;￿;j); to become a renter in the
current period h0 = 0; where ￿0 = (a0
￿;0;0;0;￿0;j + 1) 13 The decision to sell property
reveals why housing is a risky investment. At the moment of sale, the household is subject
to an idiosyncratic capital gain or amenity shock, ￿ 2 ￿: This shocks impacts the selling
value of the property by changing the size of the housing investment.14 This shock is
not revealed until the house is sold. We assume this shock is i.i.d. and discrete. The



















s:t: c￿ + a0
￿ + Rd￿ = y(a;h0;d;￿;￿j;j;q) + ￿￿;
where ￿￿ = (1 ￿ ￿s)p￿h ￿ (D(n;z)=(1 + ￿e)N(z)￿n) represents the net pro￿t from sell-
ing the house, which depends on the real income received from selling the property, p￿h,
selling transactions costs, ￿s; and remaining real value of outstanding principle, if any,
D(n;z)=(1+￿e)N(z)￿n.15 Notice that the consumption of goods, housing services, and sav-
ings are conditioned on the idiosyncratic shock since net income depends on the realization
of ￿:
4. Homeowner yesterday and homeowner today: The last case focuses on a household
that enters the period with a housing investment, h > 0, with a state ￿ = (a;h;n;z;￿;j);
and decides to continue to have a housing investment position. A critical issue is whether
the household decides to change their housing investment position.
13In the last period, all households must sell h; rent housing services, and consume all their assets, a, as a




14The idiosyncratic capital gain shock introduces a form of risk into the housing investment decision without
having to introduce an aggregate shock. Adding aggregate uncertainty is not compuationally feasible in this
model at this time. This shock can be thought of as what happens to a property if the surrounding neighborhood
deteriorates or improves. This change would be re￿ ected in the house value at the time of sale. An additional
advantage of the formulation is that it eliminates the necessity of matching buyers and sellers, as any buyer can
always purchase a brand new home with independence of the shock received by the seller.
15Since our analysis is conducted at the steady state, other than the di⁄erences between buying and selling
transaction costs, there are no di⁄erences in the purchase and selling prices of housing.
15(a) Cash-out re￿nance option: The household can decide to maintain their housing
investment position, in which case h = h0: In addition, the household has the option
to continue with their existing mortgage, if one exists, or re￿nance. The re￿nancing
decision can be expressed as
v(a;h;n;z;￿;j) = max[v1(a;h;n;z;￿;j);v2(a;h;n;z;￿;j)]: (3.6)
If the household continues with their mortgage, then z = z0 and ￿0 = (a0;h0;n ￿










s:t: c + a0 + m(x;z0)=(1 + ￿e)N(z)￿n + x(h0;s) = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + Ir
￿
R(g(h0) ￿ s) ￿ $
￿
d ￿ h0;
where v1(a;h;n;z;￿;j) denotes the optimal value associated with the continuation of
the existing mortgage contract and n0 = maxfn￿1;0g: If n0 > 0; a mortgage payment
is required. The decision on the amount of housing services to consume - and thus
maintenance expenses- depends on the choice of paying a ￿xed cost $ to become a
landlord. When the homeowner re￿nances we assume that the equity position does
not change since we assume that is not subject to the capital gain shock.
A household can choose to re￿nance their mortgage and possibly change their equity












s:t: c + a0 + ￿(z0)ph0 + m(x;z0) + x(h0;s) = y(a;h0;s;￿;￿j;j;q) + Ir
￿
R(h0 ￿ s) ￿ $
￿
￿ { + [ph ￿ D(n;z)=(1 + ￿e)N(z)￿n];
d ￿ h0;
where v2(a;h;n;z;￿;j) is the value function associated with the z0 that generates the
greatest value function from the set of mortgage contracts,Z, and { allows for a ￿xed
cost associated with re￿nancing. This individual is taking a new loan for the amount
￿(z0)ph0 and extract equity amounting to [ph￿D(n;z)=(1+￿e)N(z)￿n]: The net cost
of these two di⁄erent terms determines whether the homeowners are paying o⁄ their
house faster, using some of the equity in the house to increase consumption, or just
16changing the mortgage contract to have a longer maturity.
Clearly, if v2(a;h;n;z;￿;j) > v1(a;h;n;z;￿;j) then re￿nancing occurs. In our formu-
lation, re￿nancing is not subject to capital gains shocks.16 This mechanism provides
an additional margin to smooth temporary negative income shocks.
(b) Homeowner changes housing size: If the household decides to either up-size
























s:t: c￿ + a0
￿ + (￿b + ￿(z0))ph0
￿ + m(x;z0) + g(h0;d)








This constraint accounts for the additional (real) income from selling their home ￿￿,
the cost of buying a new home with mortgage product z0, as well as the capital gain
shock associated with the sale of the home. Just as in the third case, optimal choices
depends on the realization of the idiosyncratic shock ￿: In this case, savings and
household investment depend on this shock.
3.2. The Financial Intermediary
The ￿nancial intermediary is a zero-pro￿t business. The ￿rm receives the deposits of the house-
holds, a0; and uses these funds to make loans to ￿rms and households. Firms take out loans of
capital to produce goods and households require long-term mortgages to ￿nance the investment
in housing. They receive mortgage payments from homeowners, principal payments from indi-
viduals who sell their home with remaining principle on their mortgage, and principle payments
from individuals who unexpectedly die. The ￿nancial intermediary￿ s balance sheet determines
the equilibrium condition in the asset market. This is discussed in more detail in the Appendix.
3.3. The Production Sector
The production sector is relatively standard. Firms produce according to a constant returns-
to-scale technology, Y = f(K;L); where K and L are aggregate inputs of capital and labor,
respectively. We assume that capital depreciates at the rate ￿ > 0 each period. Firms￿output
can be used for consumption, capital investment, or housing purposes.
16This assumption prevents households from extracting equity associated with capital gains. Since in the model
we do not have aggregate shocks, the transitory shocks should not have an e⁄ect on the homeowner￿ s ability to
take on more debt.
173.4. Government
In this economy, the government engages in a number of activities: ￿nancing some exogenous
government expenditure, providing retirement bene￿ts through a social security program, and
redistributing the wealth of those individuals who die unexpectedly. We assume that the ￿nanc-
ing of government expenditures and social security are managed under di⁄erent budgets.
In the general budget constraint, revenues are generated from the taxation of adjusted in-
come. We have previously de￿ned T(ay) as the tax obligations given adjusted income. We
de￿ne t(￿) to be the tax obligations of a representative household based on their state space.
In this situation, government revenue is given by
G = T =
Z
￿jt(￿)￿(d￿); (3.8)
and thus government expenditure is determined by the amount of revenue collected from the
income taxation. The term ￿(￿) represents the measure of individuals in a given point in the
state space, ￿ ￿ (a;h;n;z;￿;j); where ￿(d￿) ￿ ￿(da ￿ dh ￿ dn ￿ dz ￿ d￿ ￿ dj):
The government provides social security bene￿ts to retired households. The bene￿t, ￿, is
based on some fraction, ￿; of the average income of workers. These payments are ￿nanced by
taxing the wage income of employed households at the rate ￿p. Since this policy is self-￿nancing,





















The ￿nal role of the government is to collect the physical and housing assets of those indi-
vidual who unexpectedly die. Both of these assets are sold and any outstanding debt on housing
is paid o⁄. The remaining value of these assets is distributed to the surviving households as a
lump-sum payment, tr. This transfer can be de￿ned as
tr = Tr=(1 ￿ ￿1);
where Tr is the aggregate (net) value of assets accumulated over the state space from unexpected










3.5. Market Clearing Conditions
This economy has four markets: the asset market, labor market, the rental of housing services
market, and the goods market. All markets are assumed to be competitive. The market clearing
condition in the goods market is given by
C + K0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K + IH + G + ￿ = F(K;L); (3.11)
where C;K;G;IH; and ￿ represent aggregate consumption, aggregate investment in real capital,
aggregate government spending, aggregate housing investment, and various transaction costs,
respectively. Each of these aggregates are de￿ne more formally in the appendix, where the recur-
sive stationary equilibrium is de￿ned. In the labor market, the equilibrium wage is determined
by the marginal product of labor, w = F2(K;L); where labor is supplied inelastically in the





The asset market clearing condition is complicated by the presence of mortgages, unexpected
death, and idiosyncratic capital gain shocks. In order to simplify the notation, let Is(￿) be an
indicator function that is equal to one when a housing investment position is sold and zero
otherwise. This function will help identify when idiosyncratic capital gain shocks are present.


































￿j(D(￿)=(1 + ￿e)N(z)￿n)￿(d￿) ￿
Z
Is(￿)=1
￿j(1 ￿  j)(D(￿)=(1 + ￿e)N(z)￿n)￿(d￿)
The left-hand side of this equation indicates the total amount of capital available to loan
to ￿rms, while the right- hand side measures the sources of this capital. The ￿rst line on the
right-hand side of the equation captures the savings deposited by households to the ￿nancial
17The new generation receives a lump sum transfer as we endow these individuals with capital assets observed
in the data. The aggregate mass of households of age 1 is ￿1 and the total population is normalized to unity.
19intermediary. The ￿rst of these terms measures household deposits if the housing position is
not sold while the second term on this line allows the deposit decision to be impacted by the
idiosyncratic capital gain shock when the housing position is sold. From the total of household
deposits, new mortgage loans must be subtracted. The second line on the right-hand side
measures new mortgages and allows for di⁄erences created by idiosyncratic capital gains shocks.
The third line measures an additional source of loanable funds as mortgage payments received
by the ￿nancial intermediary. This includes payments received by ￿rst-time buyers and existing
homeowners who continue to make payments on their mortgage, as well as those homeowners
who sell property and have a new mortgage payment, which is a⁄ected by the idiosyncratic
capital gain shock. The last line on the right-hand side of the equation captures the repayment
of remaining mortgage principal from households who sell their house as well as the repayment
of outstanding debt of households who unexpectedly die with outstanding principal.
In this model, the rental market is endogenous. Individuals who cannot a⁄ord to buy a
house must purchase or rent housing services. Rental property is supplied by those individuals
that have a positive housing investment position and pay the ￿xed cost $ > 0 to supply rental
property (i.e., h0￿d > 0): Households who supply housing services receive R(h0￿d) gross rental
income. The rental price, R; adjusts to equate the aggregate demand for housing services with
the aggregate supply of rental services. The rental market equilibrium condition is
Z
Is(￿)=0















The left-hand side of the question measures the supply of housing services while the right-hand
side measures the demand for housing services. On both sides of the equation, home sellers are
di⁄erentiated from non-sellers by recognizing that rental choices for home sellers are contingent
on the realization of the capital gain shock, ￿:
4. Parameterization
We parameterize the model to match some key moments of the U.S. economy. This strat-
egy allows us to specify a limited number of parameter values while estimating the remaining
parameters as an exercise in exactly identi￿ed generalized method of moments. With the pa-
rameterized model, we will evaluate the impact of di⁄erent mortgage contracts across various
dimensions.
4.1. Demographics
Each period in the model is taken to be three years. Individuals enter the labor force at age 20
(model period 1) and potentially live till age 86 (model period 23). Retirement is assumed to be
mandatory at age 65 (model period 16). Individuals survive to the next period with probability
20 j+1: These probabilities are set at survival rates observed in 1994, and the data are from the
National Center for Health Statistics, United States Life Tables, 1994. The size of the age-speci￿c
cohorts, ￿j; need to be speci￿ed. Because of our focus on steady-state equilibrium, these shares
must be consistent with the stationary population distribution. As a result, these shares are
determined from ￿j =  j￿j￿1=(1 + ￿) for j = 2;3;:::;J and
PJ
j=1 ￿j = 1; where ￿ denotes the
population growth rate. Using the resident population as the measure of the population, the
annual growth rate is set at 1.2 percent.
4.2. Preferences and Technology
The choice of utility function is based on the empirical evidence that suggests that the h=c ratio
increases by age as suggested by Jeske (2005). He points out that standard constant relative risk
aversion with a homogenous of degree one aggregator, U(c;d) = (c￿d1￿￿)1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿); has the
implication that the ratio of housing service to consumption stays constant over the life cycle,
even though this preference speci￿cation is capable of replicating the housing pro￿les by age as
shown by Li and Yao (2007).18 To match the hump-shaped pro￿les of housing (h) and goods
consumption (c); and the increasing ratio (h=c); we assume that preferences are represented by




+ (1 ￿ ￿)
d1￿￿2
1 ￿ ￿2
The coe¢ cients, ￿1; and ￿2; determine the curvature of the utility function with respect to
consumption and housing services. The relative ratio of ￿1 and ￿2 determines the growth
rate of the housing-to-consumption ratio. A larger curvature in consumption relative to the
curvature in housing services implies that the marginal utility of consumption exhibits relatively
faster diminishing returns. When household income increases over the life-cycle (or di⁄erent
idiosyncratic labor income shocks), a larger fraction of resources are allocated to housing services.
We set ￿2 = 1 and ￿2 = 3 to match the observed average growth rate while the preference
parameter ￿ is estimated.
The choice of technology is relatively standard. We assume that the aggregate production
function is Cobb-Douglas, F(K;L) = K￿L1￿￿; with the capital share parameter ￿ set to 0:29.
This value is calculated by dividing private ￿xed assets plus the stock of consumer durables less
the stock of residential structures by output plus the service ￿ ows from consumer durables less
the service ￿ ow from housing.19 Since the ￿rm￿ s output can be used for either consumption,
housing investment, or capital good investment, the relative price of housing, p; is equal to one.
18We also ￿nd that such a momentary utility function generates insu¢ cient movements in the housing position
and introduces some counterfactual implications for the rental market.
19A data appendix is available that details the calculation of this parameter as well as other parameters used
in the paper.
214.3. Endowments
Workers are assumed to have an inelastic labor supply, but the e⁄ective quality of their supplied
labor depends on two components. One component is age-speci￿c, ￿j; and is designed to capture
the ￿hump￿in life cycle earnings. We use data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (￿Money, Income
of Households, Families, and Persons in the Unites Stated, 1994,￿Current Population Reports,
Series P-60) to construct this variable. The other component captures the stochastic component
of earnings and is based on Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004). We discretize this income
process into a ￿ve-state Markov chain using the methodology presented in Tauchen (1986). The
values we report re￿ ect the three-year horizon employed in the model. As a result, the e¢ ciency
values associated with each possible productivity value ￿ are
￿ 2 E = f4:41;3:51;2:88;2:37;1:89g








0:47 0:33 0:14 0:05 0:01
0:29 0:33 0:23 0:11 0:03
0:12 0:23 0:29 0:24 0:12
0:03 0:11 0:23 0:33 0:29








Each household is born with an initial asset position. The purpose of this assumption is
to account for the fact that some of the youngest households who purchase housing have some
wealth. Failure to allow for this initial asset distribution creates a bias against the purchase of
homes in the earliest age cohorts. As a result we use the asset distribution observed in Panel
Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) to match the initial distribution of wealth for the cohort
of age 20 to 23. Each income state is assigned its corresponding level of assets to match the
nonhousing wealth- to-earnings ratio.
4.4. Housing
The housing market introduces a number of parameters. The purchase of a house requires a
mortgage and downpayment. In this paper we focus on the 30-year ￿xed rate mortgage as the
benchmark mortgage. As a result of the assumption that a period is three years, we set the
mortgage length, N, to ten periods. The downpayment requirement, ￿; is set to 20 percent,
which matches information from the American Housing Survey.20 The mortgage rate, rm; is
a nominal variable and is equal to the real interest rate, r, plus the expected or anticipated
in￿ ation rate, ￿e: We set the expected in￿ ation rate to 2.4 percent which corresponds to the
average in￿ ation rate observed for the period 1995-2004 using the GDP de￿ ator.
20The model allows for a ￿xed cost associated with re￿nancing. We set { equal to zero so that re￿nancing has
the best chance to occur in the model.
22Buying and selling property is subject to transaction costs. We assume that all these costs
are paid by the buyer and set ￿s = 0 and ￿b = 0:06:
Because of the lumpy nature of housing, the speci￿cation of the second point in the housing
grid has important rami￿cations. This grid point, h; determines the minimum house size and
has implications for the timing of the purchase of housing investment, wealth portfolio decisions,
and the homeownership rate. We determine the value of h as part of the estimation problem to
avoid any inadvertent e⁄ects on the results that would come from choosing this parameter.
As previously explained, housing depreciates at rates that depend on whether the property
is owner-occupied or rented. The values for ￿o and ￿r are estimated.
We used data from the 1995 American Housing Survey to quantify the i.i.d. capital gains
shock. To calculate the probability distribution for this shock, we measure capital gains based on
the purchase price of the property and what the property owner believes to be the current market
value. This ratio is adjusted by the holding length to express the appreciation in annualized
terms. Then we estimate a kernel density and discretize the density in three even partitions. The
average annualized price change ￿ 2 f0:934;0:987;1:092g and E(￿) = 1: Appropriate adjustments
were made for our model where a period corresponds to a three-year period.21
4.5. Government and the Income Tax Function
The government has three functions in the model. Income is provided to retired individuals
through a social security program. The social security budget constraint involves two parameters:
the replacement ratio, ￿; and the social security tax rate. We set the replacement ratio to be 30
percent and solve for the payroll tax rate consistent with the budget constraint. In this case,
the payroll tax is 5:25 percent.
Government spending is ￿nanced through income taxation. To get an accurate assessment of
housing policy wedges, we want the income tax code to be a good approximation of the actual
U.S. tax code. Gouveia and Strauss (1994) estimated a functional form for the U.S. federal
income tax code that is theoretically motivated by the equal sacri￿ce principle. The actual
tax paid by a household, T(ay), is based on adjusted gross income and is determined by the
functional form
T(ay) = ￿0(ay ￿ (ay￿￿1 + ￿2)
￿1
￿1 );
where (￿0;￿1;￿2) are policy parameters. The marginal income tax rate is




This functional form is very ￿ exible and allows for lump-sum (￿1 = ￿1), proportional (￿1 !
0), or progressive taxes (￿1 > 0) as special cases. The parameter ￿0 is a scaling factor that
21To test the robustness of the results based on data from the American Housing Survey, we employed a similar
approach using 1995 Tax Roll Data for Duval County in Florida. Jacksonville is the major city in Duval County.
These data follows real estate properties as opposed to individuals. We calculated annualized capital gains based
on actual sales. We found very similar estimates for the capital gains shock using this data source.
23determines the level of the tax brackets and the marginal tax rate but does not impact the
curvature of the tax function. The parameter ￿2 depends on units of measurement used to
measure income and determines the size of income deduction. Gouveia and Strauss estimate the
policy parameters and ￿nd that ￿0 = 0:258; ￿1 = 0:768; and ￿2 = 0:003710: In the benchmark
economy we use the same parameter estimates used by Gouveia and Strauss for ￿1 but ￿2 is set
to 0.3710 to accommodate the model measurement units. The parameter ￿0 is determined in
the estimation section to pin-down the share of federal revenue in GDP. Following the provisions
of the current income tax code, we allow mortgage interest payments and maintenance expenses
for rental property to be deducted from income that is taxable. In addition, rental income is
taxable, but the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing is not.22
4.6. Estimation
We estimate seven parameters using an exactly identi￿ed method of moments approach. The
parameters that need to be estimated are the depreciation rate of the capital stock, ￿; the
depreciation rate for rental units, ￿r; the depreciation rate for ownership units, ￿o; the relative
importance of consumption goods to housing services, ￿; the discount rate, ￿; the size of the
smallest housing investment position, and the tax function parameter, ￿0: We identify these
parameter values so that the resulting aggregate statistics in the model economy are equal to
seven targets observed in the U.S. economy.
1. Ratio of wealth to gross domestic product (K=Y ) : This target is the ratio of capital
to gross domestic product (GDP), which is about 2:541 (annualized value) for the period
1958-2001; we de￿ne the capital stock as private ￿xed assets plus the stock of consumer
durables less the stock of residential structures to be consistent with capital in the model.
We measure GDP to be consistent with output in the model. That is, output is measured
as reported GDP plus service ￿ ows from consumer durables less the service ￿ ow from
housing.23
2. Ratio of housing stock to ￿xed capital stock (H=K) : In this ratio, the housing
capital stock is de￿ned as the value of ￿xed assets in owner and tenant residential property.
The housing stock data is from the ￿xed asset tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We ￿nd the ratio of the housing stock to nonhousing capital stock to be 0:43:
3. Ratio of housing investment to housing stock (xH=H) : The ratio of the investment
in residential structures to housing capital stock is targeted at 0:04:
4. Ratio of housing services to consumption of goods (Rsc=c) : The targeted ratio
of housing consumption to nonhousing consumption is also based on NIPA data where
22Since this paper focuses is on the loan structure, we have abstracted from property taxes. In an earlier version
of the manuscript we allowed property tax payments and the deduction of this payment in the tax calculation.
We found that the introduction of property taxes had no quantitative e⁄ect in the results, and thus ignored these
taxes in this version for the sake of simplicity.
23We estimated service ￿ ows using procedures outlines in Cooley and Prescott (1995).
24housing services are de￿ned as personal consumption expenditures for housing and non-
housing consumption is de￿ned as nondurable and services consumption expenditures net
of housing expenditures. The targeted ratio for 1994 is 0.23, but the number does not vary
greatly over the period 1990-2000. This value is from Jeske (2005).
5. Ratio of ￿xed capital investment to GDP (￿K=Y ) : The ￿fth target is the ratio of
investment in capital goods to output, which is 0:135:
6. Homeownership rate: This target is based on data from the American Housing Survey
for 1994 and is equal to 64:0 percent.
7. Ratio of government expenditure to output (T(ay)=Y ) : The ￿nal target using NIPA
data is the government expenditure-to-output ratio. We de￿ne government expenditure
as federal government expenditures. The parameter ￿0 is endogenously determined when
solving the model to target the 7:4 percent ratio of federal government expenditure-to-GDP
observed in 1994.24
Table 1 summarizes the parameter estimates and the empirical targets. The moments and
the parameter values are presented in annual terms.
Table 1: Method of Moments Estimates (values in annual terms)
Statistic Parameter Moment Model %Error
1) Ratio of wealth to gross domestic product ￿ = 0:977 2.541 2.5418 0.0003
2) Ratio of housing stock to Fixed capital stock ￿o = 0:033 0.430 0.4241 -0.0138
3) Housing Investment to Housing Stock ratio ￿r = 0:069 0.040 0.0398 -0.0047
4) Ratio housing services to consumption of goods ￿ = 0:954 0.230 0.2291 -0.0038
5) Ratio ￿xed capital investment to GDP ￿k = 0:041 0.135 0.1347 -0.0022
6) Homeownership Rate h = 1:453 0.640 0.6397 -0.0005
7) Government expenditure to output ratio ￿0 = 0:205 0.074 0.0741 0.0008
The implied targets generated by the model solution are within 1 percent error for all the
observed targets. The estimation of the structural parameters is not separated from the com-
putation of equilibrium (households optimization problem and market clearing), which includes
three additional nonlinear equations (asset market, government budget constraint, and acciden-
tal bequest) to include in the distance minimization routine that must be satis￿ed in conjunction
with the moments observed in the data.
4.7. Model Evaluation
The baseline economy is estimated to match certain key features of the U.S. economy in 1994.
Since we want to use the model to evaluate mortgage contract choice, it is important to brie￿ y
24The Gouveia and Strauss tax function was estimated for the period 1979-1989. As our model is calibrated
for the period 1994-1996, we acknowledge some inconsistency. However, since our focus is on the importance of
various margins impacted by housing policy, we do not feel this inconsistency is a major problem.
25evaluate the performance of the model. In this section, we examine whether the model generates
reasonable patterns of participation in the owner-occupied market, housing consumption, and
￿nancial portfolio decisions. A starting point is to inquire whether the model generates a reason-
able homeownership rate.25 Since the aggregate homeownership rate is a target in the estimation
problem, we can check to see if the model generates a reasonable amount of ￿￿rst-time buyers,￿
which we de￿ne as households owning a home and being under the age of 35. Data indicates
that 37.2 percent of households in this age cohort are homeowners. The model generates a
participation rate of 37.5 percent. In Table 2, we present the homeownership rate across the age
and income distributions. As can be seen, the observed homeownership rate has a hump-shaped
behavior with the highest rate occurring in the 65-74 age range. The model generates a very
similar pattern. It should be pointed out that the under-prediction of the oldest cohort is a
result of the assumption that households must rent in the ￿nal period. Data indicate that the
homeownership rate rises with income, and the model generates a similar pro￿le. However, the
pro￿le generated by the model is steeper.
Table 2: Homeownership Rates by Age and Income
Variable Homeownership Rate
by Age Cohorts In￿ ation Rate Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 64.0 37.2 64.5 75.2 79.3 77.4
Baseline Model 0.0% 63.7 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5
2.4% 64.0 37.0 77.5 87.0 92.3 68.0
by Income Quintiles Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Data 1994 46.6 56.1 64.4 75.5 89.1
Baseline Model 0.0% 52.0 89.8 97.7 99.0 100.0
2.4% 32.5 73.6 94.2 100.0 100.0
Data source: Housing Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS) and American Housing Survey (AHS)
Another dimension of interest is the consumption of housing services. We measure average
consumption of housing services by computing the average size of an owner-occupied house.
Data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) ￿nds the average owner-occupied house is
2,137 square feet. Our model implies an average house size of 2,348 square feet. In Table 3,
we report observed housing size by age cohorts. Housing size increases until age 65 when some
downsizing begins to appear. The model captures the magnitude and the hump-shaped behavior
by age groups. However, some over-prediction of house size is observed.
25The baseline model assumes that all homeowners use the same downpayment. The empirical evidence from
the AHS suggests that repeated buyers choose downpayments close to 30 percent as opposed to the 20 percent
assumed. We solve the baseline model with an additional 30 percent downpayment choice and ￿nd insigni￿cat
deviations from the baseline economy.
26Table 3 : Owner-occupied Housing Consumption by Age1
Simulation In￿ ation Rate Total 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Data 1994 2,137 1,854 2,220 2,301 2,088 2,045
Baseline Model 0.0% 2,348 2,147 2,297 2,429 2,514 2,362
2.4% 2,237 2,161 2,283 2,413 2,522 2,367
Data source: American Housing Survey (AHS)
Since households make savings decisions with respect to assets, the portfolio allocations im-
plied by the model can be analyzed. In the model, a household ￿nancial portfolio is comprised
of asset holding and equity in housing investment. We use data from the 1994 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances to determine the importance of housing in household portfolios. We de￿ne
assets as bond and stock holdings and housing is de￿ned as the respondent￿ s estimated value
of their house adjusted for the remaining principle.26 The data indicate housing makes up a
large fraction of a household￿ s portfolio in the youngest age cohorts. This fraction declines as
the household ages until around the retirement age, and then increases as households consume
their non-housing wealth after retirement. As can be seen in Figure 1, the model generates a
very similar pattern.
Figure I: Housing in the Portfolio by Age

















Data source: Survey Consumer Finance (SCF)
26We acknowledge some inconsistency in the data and the model. The value of housing the SCF includes both
the value of the structure and the value of land. Land is not accounted for in the model. Hence, the value of
housing in the model re￿ ect soley the value of the structure.
275. The Mortgage Decision
To understand the e⁄ects of the loan structure on the mortgage decision, we allow homeowners
to choose between a 30-year ￿xed-rate contract or an alternative loan product with a di⁄erent
payment structure. The downpayment or loan-to- value ratio is the same for both contracts so
that the e⁄ect of the repayment structure can be isolated from a pure relaxation of a borrowing
constraint. We examine the various mortgage contracts in an environment where the expected
in￿ ation rate is 2.4 percent and an environment with no anticipated in￿ ation. In our formulation
all in￿ ation is anticipated, therefore when we refer to the no in￿ ation cases we mean no antic-
ipated in￿ ation. Since in￿ ation a⁄ects the slope of the repayment structure and the nominal
interest rate, an examination of both cases allows to understand the impact of anticipated in-
￿ ation. Comparing mortgages in pairs has the advantage that the results are more transparent.
In the experiments we maintain the parameters employed in the baseline environment. This
includes the tax code parameters. Since the introduction of mortgage choice a⁄ects relative
prices, revenue collection is a⁄ected. Given the focus of the paper, we abstract from the e⁄ects
introduced by holding government revenue constant.27
5.1. The Aggregate Implications of Mortgage Choice
In order to understand the importance of the repayment schedule and terms of amortization,
we examine loan products with di⁄erent payment structures. We also examine a loan with
a constant repayment pro￿le, but a lower downpayment requirement to highlight di⁄erences
between payment structure and downpayment requirement. The alternative contracts examined
are
1. Graduated payment mortgage (GPM): This class of mortgage contract has the fea-
ture that nominal loan payments increase over the length of the mortgage. Contracts in
this class di⁄er in the structure of the payment schedule as well as the growth rate of
the repayment schedule. A growth rate close to zero in a GPM contract is e⁄ectively a
￿xed rate mortgage. If a high growth rate in the repayment structure is speci￿ed, the
payment structure will have a steep positive slope, and low initial payments. The tilt
in the initial payments should make housing more a⁄ordable to low-income households
despite the 20 percent required downpayment. In fact, this contract mimics some of the
payment features of subprime contracts. We will consider a mortgage payment that grows
in a constant nominal amount at a 8 percent rate.
2. Interest-only rolled into a ￿xed-rate mortgage (hybrid): A popular product in
the subprime market is the so-called hybrid, payment-option adjustable, or option ARMs.
This product allows borrowers a choice of several payment alternatives, ranging from full
amortization of principal and interest to minimum payments in the early periods of the
27Otherwise, the determinants of mortgage decisions would be a⁄ected by changes in the level of taxation in
the economy.
28mortgage. This type of contract creates computational problems because of the amount of
state variables required to keep track of the mortgage. One way to approximate this type
of contract is to consider an interest-only loan that rolls into a ￿xed-rate mortgage after a
given number of periods. Our speci￿cation considers a 12 year (four periods) interest-only
loan with a 20 percent downpayment requirement that is rolled into a 18 year (six periods)
FRM contract. The interest rate paid during the initial part of the loan is subject to a
150 basis-point annual premium over the baseline nominal mortgage rate.28
3. Constant amortization mortgage (CAM): The prior two contracts provide house-
holds high levels of leverage and very slow amortization. The constant amortization con-
tract provides an alternative that allows households to accrue equity very fast and has
a decreasing repayment schedule. We examine this type of contract with a 20 percent
downpayment.
4. Combo or piggyback mortgage (combo 80-20): The previous three contracts share
a 20 percent downpayment requirement. In Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009),
we examine a combo mortgage that employs a secondary loan to cover the downpayment
requirement. With this type of contract, the household trades-o⁄a lower downpayment at
the expense of higher initial mortgage payments. The repayment structure of combo loan
contracts declines over the length of the mortgage as the second loan has a shorter matu-
rity than the main loan and an interest rate that is 200 basis points higher. Despite the
higher initial mortgage payments, this product allows households that are downpayment-
constrained to purchase a home. In order to highlight the role of the downpayment con-
straint, we also consider an 80-20 loan where households can borrow the full value of the
property.
In Table 4 we present the aggregate implications of mortgage decisions.
28It is interesting to point out that two contracts that have played an important role in the increase in the
homeownership rate in the U. S. during the period 2000-2006 are mortgage contracts that have a step function in
the payment structure. These are the 80-20 contracts and the ￿2-28￿and ￿3-27￿contracts in the subprime market.
The 80-20 product essentially uses a second mortgage to ￿nance the downpayment, thus avoiding mortgage interest
rate costs. When we examined this contract in an environment where anticipated in￿ ation is set to zero, we ￿nd
that the homeownership rate increases in the aggregate and youngest age cohorts to 65.5 and 46.1 percent,
respectively. A 3-27 contract involves a three-year balloon contract that rolls into a ￿xed-rate contract or a
￿ oating-rate contract for the remaining 30 years. We introduced this type of contract choice into our model and
￿nd the aggregate homeownership rate increases to 70.8 percent. More startling, the homeownership rate for the
youngest cohort increases to 68.0 percent. If we allow expected in￿ ation of 2.4 percent, the results are essentially
the same.
29Table 4: Summary Results Mortgage Choice
In￿ ation Percent Ownership Housing Size % Properties Share FRM
Simulation Rate Down Rate Owners Var. No Mortgage Mortgage Total
Data (AHS) - 64.0 2,137 969 38.6 85.0
Baseline FRM 0.0% 20% 63.7 2,348 816 28.1 100.0
2.4% 20% 64.0 2,337 805 28.2 100.0
FRM-GPM 0.0% 20% 68.5 2,351 982 1.4 45.8
2.4% 20% 65.1 2,396 923 27.6 82.0
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% 20% 65.7 2,462 890 24.8 65.4
2.4% 20% 70.5 2,499 1.010 8.8 63.4
FRM-CAM 0.0% 20% 65.5 2,472 904 24.9 33.9
2.4% 20% 65.6 2,488 903 24.9 33.0
FRM-Combo 80-20 0.0% 0% 68.6 2,446 815 20.0 66.9
2.4% 0% 66.3 2,339 807 28.2 81.3
We will initial focus on the baseline environment where the expected in￿ ation rate is 2.4 per-
cent. In general, the model suggests that the payment structure of a mortgage has implications
for tenure decisions and the size of the homes consumed. When downpayment requirements are
high (i.e. 20 percent in all contracts), households bene￿t from the introduction of a new mort-
gage loan with a variable nominal repayment structure. For example in the GPM and the hybrid
contracts, both loans have an increasing nominal repayment pro￿le that reduces the initial cost
of participating in the owner-occupied housing market. The aggregate e⁄ect is an increase in
the number of individuals that own homes. The magnitude of this immediate e⁄ect depends on
the nominal growth rate of payments. The e⁄ect in the average size of owner-occupied housing
depends on the relative opportunity cost determined in the rental markets which depend on the
general equilibrium e⁄ects. The decline in the rental price (see table 5) reduces the opportunity
cost of renting property and increases the average house size.
Both the GPM and hybrid-type contracts have the unattractive feature that the amortization
of the principal is very slow. In contrast, a constant amortization loan structure is characterized
by a declining repayment schedule and rapid amortization. With this type of loan structure,
the aggregate impact on participation is relatively small when compared with other contracts.
Interestingly, two thirds of the homeowners choose this product. In the presence of uninsurable
labor income risk, mortgage contracts that accrued equity earlier allow some homeowners to
reduce the utility cost of meeting mortgage payments every period. This precautionary motive
manifests itself as an implicit preference to have equity in the property. We ￿nd that homeowers
choose to purchase larger units with this type of contract.
Does expected in￿ ation have an e⁄ect on these ￿ndings? To address this question, we examine
the various mortgage contracts in an environment with no in￿ ation. In the baseline model with
only ￿xed rate mortgage loans the presence of in￿ ation reduces the future value of mortgage
payments but it also increases the nominal mortgage rate. With no in￿ ation the mortgage rate
is lower but the e⁄ective mortgage payments are higher in real terms. These two e⁄ects, as can
be seen in Table 4, have a similar magnitude and have almost no e⁄ect the homeownership rate
30and house size.
The elimination of in￿ ation highlights very interesting ￿ndings in the case of the GPM
and the Hybrid loan. The absence of in￿ ation when households have a choice between a ￿xed
rate contract and a either a GPM or a Hybrid contract results in a larger increase in the
homeownership rate and small reduction in the average home sizes. The explanation for this
result lies in the general equilibrium e⁄ects on the interest rate and the rental price which are
reported in Table 5. When homeowners purchase a home with a GPM mortgage, they need to
anticipate an increase in future mortgage payments. In order to meet these future obligations
they increase their savings, which results in a decline in the equilibrium interest rate. The
absence of in￿ ation and the low interest rates makes leverage more attractive. As a result,
more than 50 percent of homeowners choose this product to purchase a house. The presence of
in￿ ation increases the mortgage interest rate but also reduces the real cost of future payments.
In this environment, homeowners face a ￿ atter repayment pro￿le over time when compared to
the case with no in￿ ation and, thus, can save less. The lower level of savings results is high
interest rate making the GPM loan less attractive as only 18 percent of the homeowners opt for
this product.
The introduction of a hybrid mortgage contract also results in an increase in homeownership
when compared to the baseline economy. However, the e⁄ects on homeownership and house size
are further enhanced when in￿ ation is positive. In this case, more households choose to purchase
a house using a hybrid contract instead of a ￿xed rate contract. The repayment structure of
the hybrid loan is a step function with an initial interest -only portion and no amortization that
roles into a FRM with positive amortization. During the part of the contract that only requires
interest payments homeowers increase their savings in anticipation of the larger future mortgage
payments. The additional savings reduces the equilibrium interest rate by 10 percent and makes
both products - FRM and hybrid - more attractive. This is why the decline in the share of FRM
is relatively small. In the absence of equilibrium e⁄ects, the introduction of in￿ ation would
not result in as large a positive impact on ownership since interest payments would be more
expensive.
In the case of the CAM the presence of in￿ ation seems to have a very small role. The
intuition behind this result is very simple. In￿ ation makes the payment structure of the FRM to
decline over the length of the loan. The CAM loan also has a negative slope, so all it matters for
mortgage choice is the relative slope and how fast is equity accrued. The presence of in￿ ation
does not have a sizeable impact in the interest rate and the relative attractiveness of each
product.
The combo or piggyback loan with zero downpayment provides an interesting alternative to
loans with increasing payment structure, slow amortization, and high downpayments (GPM and
hybrid). The introduction of a zero down loan has a positive e⁄ect on ownership. This e⁄ect
is much larger in the absence of in￿ ation, suggesting that innovations in housing ￿nance which
relax downpayment constraints are more likely to have positive e⁄ects when in￿ ation is low.
31In general, these experiments suggest that either the repayment pro￿le of the loan, a decline
in the downpayment, or a combination of both results in similar quantitative ways to increase
participation in owner-occupied housing. The presence of anticipated in￿ ation can impact the
e¢ cacy of various contracts via general equilibrium e⁄ects. It should be stressed that the
importance of the loan structure has often been ignored. The standard model used to analyze
housing uses one-period-ahead mortgages where only the downpayment constraint a⁄ects tenure
decisions. Our model suggests that high downpayments can be overcome with changes in the
loan structure that deviate from the standard FRM contract and stable monetary policy.
The introduction of mortgage decisions with nontraditional loan products reveals interesting
patterns in the number of properties that are owned free and clear of mortgage obligations.
With steep repayment schedules or no downpayment requirements, the fraction of housing units
without mortgages declines. Anticipated in￿ ation magni￿es this result. Between 1993 and 2005,
the American Housing Survey reports a decline in the downpayment ratio and a decrease in the
use of ￿xed-rate contracts. Over the same period, the fraction of homeowners with no contracts
fell from 40 percent to 33 percent. We also ￿nd that when contracts other than the ￿xed-rate
contract are available, a signi￿cant fraction of households would choose a di⁄erent loan product.
This is especially true in contracts with high levels of leverage and fast amortization.
Table 5: Percentage Change Aggregates
In￿ ation Rental Interest Residential Housing
Contract Type Rate Price Rate Investment Stock
FRM-GPM 0.0% -5.0 -11.7 9.9 5.7
2.4% -2.8 0.6 2.7 3.9
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% ￿ 3.1 -0.2 2.0 3.0
2.4% -5.7 -9.9 17.1 15.7
FRM-CAM 0.0% -2.7 2.2 2.5 3.5
2.4% -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6
FRM-Combo 0.0% -6.6 -3.4 4.5 5.6
2.4% -3.1 -1.2 2.7 2.9
In Table 5, we examine the implications of loan structure for the aggregate economy. In
general, we observe, that in an environment with no in￿ ation, an increase in the demand of
owner-occupied housing results in a decline in the rental price of tenant-occupied housing. The
magnitude of this decline depends on the size of the increase in ownership. For example, the
GPM and combo have a similar e⁄ects on participation rate. When a GPM mortgage is the
available option, the rental price declines 5 percent. When the combo loan product is the
available option, rental prices declines 7 percent. Interestingly, the model￿ s predictions seem to
be consistent with the observed decline of the relative price of tenant-occupied housing in the
United States during the past decade. The e⁄ect on the interest rate depends on the number
of deposits in the ￿nancial intermediary and the resources used in housing ￿nance. The total
amount of deposits depend the level of savings of renters and homeowners. Renters face a lower
relative price for tenant-occupied housing and tend to increase their savings. The e⁄ect on
homeowners is ambiguous. For example, when the current mortgage payment is below (above)
the average payment, homeowners increase (decrease) their savings. In general, nontraditional
32loans have a relatively small impact in the interest rate. To explore the sensitivity of the
equilibrium results, we solve the model assuming global capital markets and ￿x the interest rate
to the baseline level. The model predicts quantitatively smaller e⁄ects in the participation rates
and housing consumption. For example, in the GPM loan the model predicts an increase of 66.7
percent instead of 68.5 percent and 67.6 percent versus 68.6 percent in the combo loan. The
model is also consistent with the observed increase in residential investment. The increase in
the housing stock is responsible for the e⁄ects in residential investment. The size of the increase
depends on the characteristics of the loan structure and the downpayment requirements.
The e⁄ect of positive anticipated in￿ ation, in general, lessens the aforemented ￿ndings. The
primary exception occurs when homeowners have access on an interest only loan that rolls into a
FRM contract. As we have already discussed, household move to the interest-only loan product.
The saving that occur from lower real interest payments and no principal payments are invested.
The result is a lower real equilibrium interest rate, and a large increase in residential investment
and the housing stock.
It is important to remark that some of the aggregate e⁄ects are the result of not adjusting
government expenditures across experiments. This choice is motivated by the fact that we are
interested in the equilibrium e⁄ects associated with changes in the loan structure. Adjusting
the tax rate to generate the same level of revenues would obscure the direct impact of the
aforementioned changes. However, it is important to mention that the changes in aggregate
revenue are relatively small and are the result of changes in relative prices (wages, interest
rates, and the rental price). Given this assumption, we choose not to report welfare across the
experiment. The paper￿ s objective is to understand the e⁄ects of the loan structure on the
determinants of mortgage choice and not the welfare bene￿ts associated with the additional
choice of mortgage loan products.
5.2. Distributional Implications of Mortgage Choice
More can be learned about mortgage contracts by examining the implications of alternative
payment structures from a distributional perspective. In particular, we focus on the implications
of alternative payment structures for mortgage holdings and participation rates by age and
income. This allows the attractiveness of these products to be identi￿ed for di⁄erent types of
households. The distributional implications are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
33Table 6: Age Cohort E⁄ects of Mortgage Type
In￿ ation Home Ownership Percent
Contract Type Rate Rate Holding FRM
20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89 20-34 35-49 50-64 65-74 75-89
Baseline FRM 0.0% 37.5 76.5 86.4 91.3 66.5 100 100 100 100 100
2.4% 37.0 77.5 87.0 92.3 68.0 100 100 100 100 100
FRM-GPM 0.0% 55.3 78.2 77.3 82.7 73.3 45.0 47.3 45.6 40.8 52.3
2.4% 38.7 78.7 87.6 93.6 67.0 63.0 87.8 92.6 76.9 98.3
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% 39.2 80.9 87.8 92.4 65.7 31.1 72.6 82.8 70.9 90.0
2.4% 52.1 83.7 85.7 87.3 69.2 53.3 77.2 72.6 49.6 65.8
FRM-CAM 0.0% 38.6 79.6 88.7 93.6 67.1 58.3 28.3 18.1 30.9 21.5
2.4% 37.3 78.3 86.8 92.5 68.0 58.4 28.6 18.2 30.9 21.6
FRM-Combo 80/20 0.0% 47.2 82.9 85.3 91.0 66.3 55.1 73.2 76.7 57.4 64.2
2.4% 40.0 80.9 89.8 90.6 67.7 62.9 87.4 92.2 69.9 98.8
Consistent with the logic of the previous section, the model reveals that mortgage loans
that track household income early in the life-cycle have a signi￿cant impact on the participation
rate of younger cohorts. However, this e⁄ect is muted as anticipated in￿ ation increases over all
contract, with the exception being the hybrid contract. In the case of the GPM loan, the e⁄ect
is particularly large even with a 20 percent downpayment requirement. The absence of in￿ ation
makes the repayment pro￿le steeper and more attractive for young cohorts when compared to the
baseline model. One might expect that the option of choosing a mortgage loan with a payment
structure that tracks income growth would increase the participation rate for all households
over the age distribution. We ￿nd that this is not necessarily the case for loans with a steep
repayment pro￿le (GPM) when in￿ ation is zero or very low. The steep increase in mortgage
payments can make it ￿nancially infeasible for homeowners that have received a series of negative
income shocks and face increasing payment obligations. The presence of in￿ ation lessens this
e⁄ect as the real value of future mortgage obligations are reduced. We ￿nd a positive relation
between the pro￿le of repayment (not reported in the table) and the participation of young
cohorts. The combo loan trades-o⁄ a low downpayment at the expense of high initial mortgage
payments. The presence of in￿ ation increases the initial costs of the outstanding mortgage debt
since the mortgage rate is higher. The result is that in￿ ation makes the product relatively less
attractive for ￿rst-time buyers.
The model indicates that the fraction of individuals holding the FRM increases with age,
but the pro￿le is not necessarily monotone, as the retirement break seems to cause a reset in the
fraction of individuals holding each product. This is due to two factors. First, income uncertainty
disappears for retired households even though mortality risk become more predominant at older
ages. Second, retired individuals have lower income levels, making additional leverage a form of
insurance.
In sum, the model suggests a certain separation of mortgage choice. Younger households
tend to have low income and wealth making it di¢ cult to smooth negative shocks. As a result,
they tend to choose a loan with either a low initial mortgage payment or a low downpayment.
Households that expect to receive positive income shocks or have larger asset holdings tend to
34choose contracts that increase their equity in the home. This result is related to the fact that
average income increases over the life-cycle, even for individuals that receive negative shocks.
This ￿nding indicates loan structure has di⁄erent e⁄ects for constrained and unconstrained
homeowners. The results become clearer when we explore mortgage choice by income groups.29
Table 7: Income Distribution E⁄ects of Mortgage Type
In￿ ation Home Percent
Contract Type Rate Ownership Rate Holding FRM
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Baseline FRM 0.0% 52.0 89.8 97.7 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2.4% 32.5 73.6 94.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
FRM-GPM 0.0% 59.8 79.3 99.2 100 100 46.0 29.1 76.7 100 94.8
2.4% 54.2 92.0 96.7 98.7 100 82.0 96.5 51.9 100 94.8
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% 54.9 91.5 97.8 100 100 64.1 85.7 51.7 100 100
2.4% 61.8 85.7 78.4 100 100 67.8 36.0 82.7 100 100
FRM-CAM 0.0% 54.6 93.8 97.5 100 100 33.4 20.7 61.2 14.7 0.0
2.4% 56.6 91.6 97.3 100 100 33.1 23.2 60.0 15.2 0.0
FRM-Combo 0.0% 58.9 88.0 96.2 100 100 68.3 50.3 68.9 99.8 95.6
2.4% 57.6 89.9 87.1 94.2 100 81.9 92.0 36.3 100 100
There are three important results in Table 7 that summarize the e⁄ects of the loan structure
on mortgage choice by income. First, the option of using a contract with either low initial
mortgage payments or a higher loan-to-value ratio has a positive impact on the participation
rate of the lowest income group when compared with the baseline model. This conclusion
is independent of the degree of in￿ ation. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the increase in
participation for the lowest income group in all cases with the exception of the hybrid case
where strong general equilibrium e⁄ects are present. Second, the majority of individuals in
the two highest income groups prefer loans that maximize the equity in the house like the
traditional FRM or the constant amortization product. This result, which does not depend
on whether anticipated in￿ ation is positive, is most apparent when the CAM loan is available
as an option to the FRM. Third, the decline in participation for the second income group in
the GPM with no in￿ ation as compared with the baseline case is consistent with the drop in
participation by age observed in the prior table and is directly related to the rise in mortgage
payments. Households are attracted to these products because of the low initial mortgage cost;
however, those that receive negative income shocks cannot a⁄ord the higher payments and are
forced to sell their property. The presence of in￿ ation eliminates this e⁄ect since the real value
of the mortgage payment is less.
These results reveal that some of the nontraditional products can successfully increase par-
ticipation of young and poorer households in the short-run, but can cause some visible swings
in the participation rate by age and income over a longer term. As the e⁄ects of idiosyncratic
uncertainty are mitigated over the life-cycle (the fraction of borrowing-constrained households
29The income partitions have been calculated by splitting the range of income in ￿ve bins and assigning individ-
uals of a given income level associated with the implied bin. As a result, the fraction of individuals participating
in each bin is not the same. The model predicts that the majority of the individuals belong to the lowest income
bins.
35falls after age 40), these individuals can use the same contracts to re-enter the owner-occupied
market, keeping the aggregate ownership from falling. This ￿nding suggests that nontraditional
contracts introduce very interesting dynamics in the patterns of buying and selling. To illus-
trate the e⁄ects of nontraditional products in the market, we present some summary measures
of housing transactions in Table 8.
Table 8: Summary Measures for Housing Transactions
Interest Homeowners Entry, Exit, and Stay
Contract Type Rate Move % Upsize % Downsize Rent to Own Own to Rent Rent to Rent
Baseline FRM 0.0% 1.7 97.0 3.0 6.0 1.5 34.8
2.4% 1.6 99.0 1.0 6.1 1.6 34.4
FRM-GPM 0.0% 13.7 47.3 52.7 18.9 23.5 12.6
2.4% 2.9 84.0 16.0 6.4 1.8 33.0
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% 3.5 85.5 14.5 6.5 1.9 32.4
2.4% 12.7 41.3 58.7 15.6 10.9 18.6
FRM-CAM 0.0% 3.9 82.1 17.9 6.5 2.0 32.5
2.4% 3.9 82.3 17.7 6.6 2.0 32.4
FRM-Combo 0.0% 8.9 63.6 36.4 11.0 6.4 25.0
2.4% 2.9 73.7 25.3 6.7 2.2 31.5
This table presents statistics on the fraction of homeowners who choose to change their
housing status, as well as statistics that measure entry and exit decisions. We ￿nd two important
insights in the absence of in￿ ation. First, the introduction of nontraditional loans - those with
low initial payments, low downpayments, or both - have an important impact on mobility. The
GPM and the combo loan, to a lesser extent, stand out as the fraction of homeowners who move
is much greater than that observed with the other loan contracts. These products increase the
mobility in the housing market, and increase the probability of downsizing. This suggests that
some households purchase large housing units given the relatively low initial ￿nancing costs.
However, those individuals that cannot a⁄ord the increase in mortgage obligations are forced
to downsize or sell. This leads to the second important ￿nding. In the baseline model there is
a relation of around 4 to 1 between households that move into ownership and households who
sell their house and rent. When nontraditional loans are available, this relation becomes almost
1 to 1, indicating much more mobility. In addition, the number of individuals that remain
continuous renters decreases with nontraditional contracts. These results are consistent with
the observation that the loans with low entry costs, are very successful in attracting relatively
young and low-income households to the owner-occupied housing market.
The presence of in￿ ation does e⁄ect the above conclusions. The increased mobility that was
observed with GPM or Combo products is signi￿cantly reduced. The increase in the nominal
mortgage rate that results in a higher monthly payment reducing the number of households who
move from being a renter to a homeowner. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the real value of
mortgage obligations and implies less mobility from the homeowner status to the renter status.
While in￿ ation does impact mobility between the renter and homeownership states, one should
not conclude that mobility within the homeownership state is impaired. Table 8 indicates that
for the GPM or Combo cases upsizing is increased while downsizing is decreased. The presence
36of in￿ ation reduces the real value of the mortgage payment and the outstanding loan overtime.
This makes it easier for a household to upsize their house and lessens the need to downsize their
house.
The case of the hybrid loan requires a special comment as household behavior is di⁄erent
in the presence of in￿ ation. Many household, especially households that are young or have low
incomes, choose the hybrid loan because of the interest-only portion of the loan. When the
interest-only loan rolls into a ￿xed rate mortgage, the model indicates two things can happen.
Poorer household￿ s may be forced to sell their house as they may not be able to a⁄ord the
increase in mortgage obligations, or downsize their house. The household who are more wealthy
or have higher income re￿nance and upsizing their housing position using a standard FRM.
5.3. Risk Sharing Implications of Mortgage Choice
In economies with incomplete markets and long-term mortgage loans changes in loan structure
have interesting e⁄ects on risk sharing that di⁄er from the standard durable good model with
a one-period-ahead collateralized loan.30 In the standard model, individuals can mitigate labor
income risk by changing house size to help smooth consumption. This is possible because the
￿nancial obligations do not have long-term e⁄ects. In models with long-term contracts, the
decision to purchase a house results in the obligation of a mortgage payment. Consequently,
the house payment reduces disposable income and, in the presence of negative income shocks,
individuals lose part of the ability to smooth consumption.31 Loans with di⁄erent repayment
structure introduce more ￿ exibility to mitigate income risk and/or accumulate wealth. For some
wealthy individuals with positive income shocks, this implies contracts that maximize the equity
in the house. For young and low-income households, the optimal choice of a contract is one with
increasing payment over the length of the mortgage or higher loan-to-value ratios. The result
should be a reduction in the variance of consumption for homeowners, but not necessarily in the
variance of housing since some of these mortgage loans force some individuals in and out of the
housing market.
We study these e⁄ects by computing the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption and housing
services for the various mortgage contracts. In Table 9, we see that the benchmark economy,
with no anticipated in￿ ation, generates a coe¢ cient of variation of consumption that is 0.113
with renters having a larger coe¢ cient than homeowners. Our measure of variance indicates that
the consumption of housing services is 0.487, with renters once again having a larger variance
compared with owners. If anticipated in￿ ation is 2.4 percent, the coe¢ cient of variation of
consumption declines to 0.109 while the coe¢ cient of variation for homeowners declines and
increases for renters. By themselves these numbers do not have much meaning since they
30We have in mind a model where there are no transaction costs and housing wealth, ph
0; and ￿nancial wealth,
(1 + r)a
0; can be summarized by a single-state variable such as cash on hand x
0 = ph
0 + (1 + r)a
0 and where the
period budget constraint is de￿ned by c + ph
0 + a
0 = w + x and the mortgage constraint is a
0 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)ph
0:
31In our model, ownership provides an alternative mechanism to smooth consumption. Homeowners can pay a
￿xed cost and supply rental property in the market. They can use the additional rental income to cover the cost
of mortgage payments. However, this mechanism is costly.
37depend on the measurement unit, but the relative numbers indicate whether new contracts
allow households to better smooth consumption.
Table 9: E⁄ects of Mortgage Choice on Risk Sharing
Coe¢ cient of Variation
In￿ ation Consumption Housing
Simulation Rate Total Owner Renters Total Owner Renters
Baseline FRM 0.0% 0.113 0.088 0.293 0.487 0.291 3.130
2.4% 0.109 0.083 0.315 0.455 0.265 3.347
FRM-GPM 0.0% 0.098 0.077 0.160 0.466 0.264 1.400
2.4% 0.120 0.091 0.347 0.451 0.257 3.729
FRM-Hybrid 0.0% 0.114 0.085 0.354 0.506 0.295 3.946
2.4% 0.11 0.086 0.220 0.390 0.210 2.070
FRM-CAM 0.0% 0.110 0.084 0.336 0.482 0.290 3.578
2.4% 0.113 0.084 0.357 0.477 0.281 3.821
FRM-Combo 0.0% 0.110 0.085 0.274 0.384 0.200 3.035
2.4% 0.102 0.075 0.265 0.439 0.256 2.599
As can be seen, loan structure can reduce the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption for
homeowners. This reduction is especially important for contracts that allow for a steep pro￿le
of repayment (GPM) and anticipated in￿ ation is near zero. An anticipated in￿ ation rate of 2.4
percent actually results in an increase in the consumption coe¢ cient for all households, but it
reduces the coe¢ cient of variation of housing services for homeowners. The reduction in the
variability of consumption for this type of contract for renters when there is no anticipated
in￿ ation is an artifact of the general equilibrium e⁄ects that reduce the equilibrium price of
rental-occupied housing. We also observe that the contracts that result in a larger number
of transactions in the housing market, such as the hybrid and combo contracts, can result in
smoother consumption of housing services if anticipated in￿ ation is near zero. However, as
anticipated in￿ ation increases, this ￿nding becomes more tenuous. The sizeable entry and exit
decisions observed in the GPM allow households to reassess the optimal house size and thus
reduce consumption of housing services. The di⁄erence in the coe¢ cient of variation between
goods and housing services consumption is a result of the preference speci￿cation that assumes
imperfect substitution between both goods. When income increases over the life-cycle, the
household increase spending on housing services. This explains why in the hybrid contract case
with no anticipated in￿ ation, the coe¢ cient of variation with respect to consumption is reduced,
while the coe¢ cient of variation with respect to housing increases slightly.
6. Conclusion
Historically, it appears that innovations in housing ￿nance have preceded important booms in
housing in the United States. These innovations have modi￿ed the characteristics of the loan
structure by changing the pro￿le of repayment and amortization schedules. The recent meltdown
in the subprime mortgage market further highlights the important role played by housing ￿nance
and loan structure. Unfortunately, there is limited research that examines this connection. In
the canonical model with complete markets, the determinants of mortgage choice are irrelevant.
38Evidence indicates that households are subject to constraints that are not fully captured by this
stylized framework. The objective of this paper is to understand the e⁄ects mortgage choice
has over alternative contract structures in an economy with incomplete markets. We argue
that the importance of the loan structure has often been ignored in the literature that focuses
on the relaxation of downpayment constraints. With this purpose, we develop a quantitative
equilibrium theory of mortgage choice. In the model, households face uninsurable mortality and
labor income risks and make decisions with respect to consumption (goods and housing services)
and asset allocation (capital and risky housing investment). The model stresses the dual role
of housing as a consumption and risky investment good. Investment in housing di⁄ers from
investment in real capital since it requires a long-term mortgage loan that di⁄ers along several
dimensions (downpayment requirement, payment schedule, and amortization). Thus, the model
allows for mortgage contract choice.
We show that the loan structure has important implications for tenure decisions and the size
of the homes consumed. When the downpayment requirement is high, households bene￿t from
the introduction of loan products with a variable nominal repayment structure. An increasing
repayment loan structure increases the participation in the owner-occupied market since it re-
duces the entry costs. By contrast, a decreasing repayment structure shifts the demand away
from the ￿xed-rate mortgage loan since as homeowners are able to maximize the equity in their
house. We argue that either the repayment pro￿le of the loan, a decline in the downpayment,
or a combination of both results in similar quantitative ways to increase participation in owner-
occupied housing. The presence of in￿ ation reduces real payments over the length of the loan.
In general, we ￿nd that mortgage loans with variable payments are more e⁄ective when in￿ ation
is low. The structure of a mortgage has an important impacts on mobility. The presence of
in￿ ation reduces the real value of the mortgage payment and the outstanding loan overtime
making it easier for a household to upsize their house and lessens the need to downsize their
house.
From a disaggregate perspective, the option of using a contract with either low initial mort-
gage payments or a higher loan-to-value ratio has a positive impact on the participation rate of
the lowest income group when compared with the baseline model. This conclusion is indepen-
dent of the degree of in￿ ation. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the increase in participation for
the lowest income group in all cases with the exception of the hybrid case where strong general
equilibrium e⁄ects are present. Second, the majority of individuals in the two highest income
groups prefer loans that maximize the equity in the house such as the traditional FRM or the
constant amortization product. This ￿nding is not impacted by in￿ ation. Third, the presence
of in￿ ation mitigates some of the negative e⁄ects of increasing mortgage payments since its real
value declines over the length of the loan.
In economies with incomplete markets, the payment structure of a long-term mortgage con-
tract can provide opportunities for households to smooth income risk. The resulting decisions
of homeowners has general equilibrium price e⁄ects which has bene￿cial e⁄ects for renters. We
argue that loan structure can reduce the coe¢ cient of variation of consumption for homeowners.
39This reduction is especially important when we consider mortgages with an increasing repay-
ment structure and no in￿ ation. The presence of in￿ ation reduces the coe¢ cient of variation of
housing services at the expense of goods consumption.
Given the complexity of the problem, we view these results as evidence that housing ￿nance
is an important channel that requires further analysis. Our study of the determinants of mort-
gage choice in a model with heterogeneous consumers and incomplete markets is subject to
certain limitations. In our model, homeowners that cannot a⁄ord to meet the payments without
violating the non-negativity constraint in consumption are forced to sell. However, this ￿nding
suggests a model that allows foreclosures when equity is less that the remaining mortgage debt
could be useful in understanding episodes of housing default. This is especially true in an envi-
ronment with stagnant or declining house prices. We have also abstracted from the implications
of mortgage choice in house prices. In addition to housing ￿nance, the dynamics of house prices
are a⁄ected by many other relevant variables such as the supply of new construction and pro-
ductivity growth, just to name two. While this connection is certainly important - at least some
preliminary evidence from the housing booms in the past century seem to suggest it - we leave
this channel for future research.
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7. Appendix: De￿nition of Recursive Stationary Equilibrium
We restrict ourselves to stationary equilibria. The individual state variables are asset holdings, a,
housing investment holdings, h, mortgage contract type, z, mortgage status, n, labor productiv-
ity status, ￿; and age,j: The individual state of the economy is completely described by the joint
measure ￿ over asset positions, housing investment positions, mortgage contract type, mortgage
status, productivity state, and age, where ￿ = (a;h;z;n;￿;j): Let a 2 A ￿ R+; h 2 H ￿ R+;
z2 Z ￿I;n 2 N = (1;2;:::;N) 2 I; ￿ 2 E = f￿1;￿2;￿3;￿4;￿5g ￿ I; j 2 J = (1;2;:::;J) ￿ I; and
let S = R+ ￿ R+ ￿ Z ￿ N ￿ E ￿ J:
De￿nition (Stationary Equilibrium): Let us de￿ne Is to be an indicator function that is
equal to one when a housing investment position is sold and zero otherwise. Given a set of time-
invariant ￿scal policy arrangements {G,￿y(￿0;￿1;￿2);￿p(￿)g; and initial conditions, a stationary
equilibrium is a collection of value functions, v(a;h;z;n;￿;j;): A ￿ H ￿ Z ￿ M ￿ E ￿ J ! R;




S ! R+g if Is = 1, aggregate outcomes fK;Ng; prices fr;p;R;rmg; stationary population and
invariant distribution ￿(a;h;z;n;￿;j) such that
421. Given prices, fr;p;R;rmg; policies, transfers, and initial conditions, the value function v
and decision rules c; s; a0; and h0 solve the consumer￿ s problem as speci￿ed in equations
(3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7).
2. Transfers are de￿ned in equation (3.10).
3. The asset market as de￿ned by equation (3.12) clears.
4. The rental market as de￿ned by equation (3.13) clears.
5. The goods market condition is de￿ned as
C + K0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K + IH + G + ￿ = F(K;N);
where C, K0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K; IH, G, ￿ represent aggregate consumption expenditures, ag-
gregate investment in ￿xed capital, aggregate investment in housing goods, government


































































6. The labor market clears where labor demand, as determined by the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst-order
condition, is equal to labor supply.
7. The general government balances as speci￿ed by equation (3.8).
8. The social security program is self-￿nancing with the tax rate determined by equation
(3.9).
439. Letting T be an operator, which maps the set of distributions into itself aggregation,
requires
￿0(a0;h0;z;n ￿ 1;￿0;j + 1) = T(￿);
with T also consistent with individual decisions. We will restrict ourselves to equilibria
which satisfy
￿0 = T(￿);
where the function T : M ! M.
44